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Abstract
This paper illustrates how households’ heterogeneity is crucial for the propagation of uncertainty
shocks. We empirically show that an uncertainty shock generates a drop in aggregate consumption, job
finding rate, and inflation: the aggregate consumption response is mainly driven by the consumption
response of the bottom 60% of the income distribution. A heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model
with search and matching frictions and Calvo pricing rationalizes our findings. Uncertainty shocks
induce households’ precautionary saving and firms’ precautionary pricing behaviors, triggering a fall
in aggregate demand and supply. The two precautionary behaviors increase the unemployment risk of
the imperfectly insured, who strengthen their precautionary saving behavior. When the feedback loop
between unemployment risk and precautionary saving is strong enough, a rise in uncertainty leads to
a decrease in inflation. Contrary to standard representative agent New Keynesian models, our model
qualitatively and quantitatively matches the empirical evidence on uncertainty shock propagation.
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession has sparked a wide debate on the impact of uncertainty on the macroeconomy. After
the seminal paper of Bloom (2009), close attention has been devoted to study the consequences of uncertainty
shocks over the business cycle. An increase in uncertainty has been shown to cause a contraction of output
and its subcomponents.1
While the existing literature has focused on the transmission of uncertainty shocks to the macroeconomy,
it has not considered how households’ heterogeneity affects their propagation. This paper illustrates how
heterogeneity is key to the transmission of uncertainty to the macroeconomy and, in particular, to inflation.
Empirical work has shown that an increase in uncertainty leads to a drop in output and its main components,
as well as a drop in inflation, and an increase in unemployment. The theoretical literature, on the other hand,
while being able to explain how a rise in uncertainty propagates to output, consumption, and unemployment,
has not been successful in robustly explaining why inflation drops.2 Our paper shows that households respond
heterogeneously to increases in uncertainty and this heterogeneity is able to explain why inflation decreases
following an uncertainty shock.
To corroborate the already existing empirical evidence on the propagation of macro uncertainty shocks,
we start by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) of macro variables, labor market variables, and the
macro uncertainty index of Jurado et al. (2015). We use a recursive identification where macro uncertainty
is ordered first. We show that a rise in macro uncertainty leads to a drop in output, the job finding
rate, consumption, and inflation, and an increase in the unemployment rate and the separation rate. To
gain a deeper understanding of the mechanism driving the macro dynamics, we estimate a VAR by using
consumption and income micro data from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CEX). This allows us to
study the heterogeneous response of consumption across the households’ income distribution. We show that
the response of aggregate consumption is driven by the response of households belonging to the bottom 60%
of the income distribution. Instead, the consumption response of households in the top 40% of the income
distribution is not significant.
To rationalize these findings, our paper proposes a theoretical mechanism whereby an increase in macro
uncertainty results in a drop in inflation and generates responses of output, consumption, unemployment
rate, job finding rate, and separation rate, which are quantitatively, as well as qualitatively in line with
the empirical evidence. We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with the following
1Following the macro literature, we use the word ‘uncertainty’ to refer to ‘objective uncertainty’ or ‘risk’, in which the
probabilities are well understood by all agents. There could be an alternative source of uncertainty, that is ambiguity, in which
the probabilities are not well understood.
2While Leduc and Liu (2016) show that an uncertainty shock resembles an aggregate demand shock as it increases unem-
ployment, while decreasing inflation, Fasani and Rossi (2018) argue that their result hinges upon the Taylor rule specification
and it can actually be flipped by using different Taylor rules.
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features: household heterogeneity induced by unemployment risk and imperfect risk sharing à la Challe et
al. (2017), labor market search and matching (SaM) frictions à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and
Calvo (1983)-type price rigidities. We model uncertainty as a second moment shock to technology.
Within this framework, we study how a positive uncertainty shock propagates throughout the econ-
omy. In representative agent New Keynesian models (RANK) such as Born and Pfeifer (2014), Fernández-
Villaverde et al. (2015), and Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015), uncertainty shocks have two effects. The first
effect is on aggregate demand and works through the precautionary saving behavior of risk-averse households.
Due to the convexity of the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption, higher
uncertainty induces households to increase their savings. The second effect is on aggregate supply and works
through the precautionary pricing behavior of firms. When uncertainty increases, firms which are allowed
to reset their price, increase it to self-insure against the risk of being stuck with low prices in the future.
Since the increase in prices induced by the precautionary pricing behavior of firms is stronger than the drop
in prices induced by the precautionary saving behavior of risk-averse households, inflation increases after
a positive uncertainty shock. Enhancing this framework with households’ heterogeneity adds an indirect
channel of precautionary savings, which has powerful implications on the propagation of uncertainty shocks.
This channel works as follows. The drop in aggregate demand and aggregate supply induces firms to lower
their vacancy posting. This reduces households’ job finding rate and increases unemployment risk. Since
some households are borrowing constrained and subject to only partial risk sharing, an increase in unemploy-
ment risk pushes them to further strengthen their precautionary saving behavior. When the feedback loop
between precautionary savings and unemployment risk sufficiently amplifies the negative demand effects of
uncertainty shocks, the latter have deflationary effects. Moreover, this feedback effect is able to reinforce
the responses of output, consumption, and unemployment rate so as to be quantitatively in line with the
empirical evidence.
Related Literature Our paper belongs to the fast growing literature of heterogeneous agent New Key-
nesian (HANK) models, such as those developed by McKay and Reis (2016) and Kaplan et al. (2018). More
specifically, it is related to the novel literature of HANK models with SaM frictions, which studies how labor
market frictions interact with households’ precautionary saving behavior. Within this literature, Gornemann
et al. (2016) show how unemployment risk is endogenous to monetary policy, McKay and Reis (2017) investi-
gate optimal social insurance against uninsurable risks to income and unemployment, Ravn and Sterk (2017)
study how nominal and labor market rigidities along with household heterogeneity produce amplification
and account for key features of the Great Recession, Ravn and Sterk (2018) revisit the qualitative results of
the New Keynesian literature in light of the interaction between HANK and SaM, Cho (2018) assesses the
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importance of unemployment risk for aggregate business cycle dynamics, and Dolado et al. (2018) analyze
the distributional effects of monetary policy in the presence of SaM frictions and capital-skill complemen-
tarity. Closer to our paper, Challe et al. (2017) construct and estimate a tractable HANK model with SaM
frictions, while Challe (2019) study optimal monetary policy in the presence of uninsured unemployment risk
and nominal rigidities. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to study uncertainty shocks in the context of
a HANK model with SaM frictions and highlight how these features are crucial to explain the propagation
of uncertainty throughout the economy.
The second stream of literature this paper is related to is the one on uncertainty. Since the seminal
work of Bloom (2009), many papers have studied how uncertainty affects economic activity. The literature
has focused on different types of uncertainty: financial uncertainty (Ludvigson et al., 2019), stock market
volatility (Bloom, 2009; Basu and Bundick, 2017), uncertainty as risk or ambiguity (Backus et al., 2015),
consumers’ perceived uncertainty (Leduc and Liu, 2016), firm-specific uncertainty (Bachmann et al., 2013),
economic policy uncertainty (Baker et al., 2016), and fiscal policy uncertainty (Born and Pfeifer, 2014;
Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015). This paper focuses specifically on macro uncertainty as estimated by
Jurado et al. (2015) and updated by Ludvigson et al. (2019). The main contribution of this paper to the
literature on uncertainty is to highlight the importance of the interaction between households’ heterogeneity
and labor market SaM frictions in the transmission of uncertainty shocks to the macroeconomy.
Our contribution is both empirical and theoretical. On the empirical side, this paper studies the
propagation of macro uncertainty shocks across different levels of households’ income by using CEX Surveys
data. This data has been collected by Heathcote et al. (2010), and then used by Anderson et al. (2016)
and Ma (2018) to study government spending shocks, by De Giorgi and Gambetti (2017) to analyze the
interaction between business cycles and the consumption distribution, and by Wong (2019) to show the
effects of demographic changes on the transmission of monetary policy to consumption. On the theoretical
side, this paper adds to the literature on uncertainty shock propagation along two dimensions. First, it is
able to match quantitatively the empirical responses of consumption and inflation to an identified uncertainty
shock. Second, and most importantly, it is able to generate a decrease in inflation in response to an increase
in uncertainty and to uncover the underling mechanism explaining this decrease. Papers like Born and
Pfeifer (2014) and Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015) obtain an increase in prices as a consequence of higher
uncertainty. This is due to price rigidities à la Calvo, which trigger a precautionary pricing behavior of firms.
On the other hand, papers like Leduc and Liu (2016), Basu and Bundick (2017), and Cesa-Bianchi and
Fernandez-Corugedo (2018) find that an increase in uncertainty leads to a decrease in prices. This is mainly
due to their assumption of price rigidities à la Rotemberg (1982). There are multiple reasons why Calvo-
type rigidities are preferable to Rotemberg-type rigidities, especially when solving a model at higher order
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approximation. First, it is quite difficult to attach a structural interpretation to the Rotemberg adjustment
cost parameter, as there is no natural equivalent in the data. In contrast, for the Calvo approach various
papers have computed average price durations, e.g. Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008). The literature on price rigidities has therefore regularly made use of the first-order equivalence
of Rotemberg- and Calvo-type adjustment frictions by translating the Rotemberg adjustment costs to an
implied Calvo price duration via the slope of the New Keynesian price Phillips Curve. Second, despite being
equivalent to Calvo-type rigidities at first order approximation, Rotemberg-type rigidities generate opposite
responses of prices to uncertainty shocks as shown in Oh (2019). In particular, Rotemberg-type rigidities lack
the precautionary pricing channel, which has been shown to be at play by micro-founded menu cost models
(Vavra, 2014; Bachmann et al., 2018). To the contrary, Calvo-type rigidities allow for this channel and are
therefore preferable. Moreover, Fasani and Rossi (2018) show that the responses of inflation to uncertainty
shocks in the presence of Rotemberg-type rigidities are very much dependant on the Taylor rule specification
and could become positive once empirically plausible degree of interest rate smoothing is considered.
Another paper focusing on uncertainty and heterogeneity is Bayer et al. (2019). Our paper differs from
it along several dimensions. While Bayer et al. (2019) study individual households’ income volatility, we
focus on the propagation of aggregate macro uncertainty. In addition, when solving for aggregate dynamics,
Bayer et al. (2019) use a first-order perturbation. Instead, we solve the model at third order, which allows
us to obtain a precautionary pricing motive for firms, which would not be present at a first order approxi-
mation. Third, we have a frictional labor market, which is necessary to explain the feedback effect between
unemployment risk and precautionary saving, which is the one driving our main results.
Last but least, on the methodological side, we contribute to the literature by studying the propagation
of uncertainty shocks in a heterogeneous agent framework that is tractable. Studying uncertainty shocks
requires to solve the model to a third order approximation. This gets extremely complicated in fully fledged
heterogeneous models, which are solved by Krusell and Smith (1998) projection method and Reiter (2009).
However, Challe et al. (2017)’s assumptions on unemployment spells and binding borrowing constraints allow
us to simplify the heterogeneity of households, thus being able to study uncertainty shocks in a tractable
framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows empirical evidence on the responses
of macroeconomic variables to an increase in uncertainty. Section 3 describes the HANK model. Section
4 displays the quantitative results. Section 5 illustrates how much each precautionary saving and pricing




Recent papers such as Carriero et al. (2018a) and Angelini et al. (2019) show that macroeconomic uncertainty
can be considered exogenous when evaluating its effects on the US macro economy. To show how the US
economy reacts to an exogenous increase in uncertainty, we estimate a quarterly frequency VAR with a
constant and two lags suggested by the Hannan-Quinn information criterion. The variables included in
our VAR are: macroeconomic uncertainty, log of per capita real GDP, the job finding rate, the separation
rate, the unemployment rate, log of per capita real consumption (including nondurable goods and services),
inflation (first-differenced logged consumer price index), and the policy rate. To measure macroeconomic
uncertainty we use the macro uncertainty index estimated by Jurado et al. (2015) and then updated by
Ludvigson et al. (2019).3 For the job finding rate and the separation rate we use the series computed by
Shimer (2012) and updated by Pizzinelli et al. (2018).4 As for the policy rate, we use the quarterly average
of the effective Federal funds rate. However, since the sample includes a period during which the Federal
funds rate hits the zero lower bound (ZLB), from 2009Q1 to 2015Q3 we use the shadow Federal funds rate
constructed by Wu and Xia (2016).5 This shadow rate is not bounded below by zero and better summarizes
the stance of monetary policy. The remaining series are retrieved from the FRED of St. Louis Fed.6
We identify uncertainty shocks by using a Cholesky decomposition where macro uncertainty is ordered
first. This ordering implies that uncertainty does not react contemporaneously to the other variables included
in the VAR. We use US quarterly data over the sample period 1982Q1-2015Q3. As it is common practice in
this literature, to avoid parameter instability we start our sample only after the beginning of Paul Volcker’s
mandate as the Federal Reserve Chairman.7
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock in the macro uncertainty index.
GDP and the job finding rate drop significantly and persistently for sixteen quarters, while the separation
rate rises significantly for four quarters. The response of the unemployment rate is positive and persistent
and reaches a 0.2 percentage point increase at its peak. Consumption drops at its minimum by more than
3The updated version of the macro uncertainty series is obtained from the author’s website, https://www.sydneyludvigson.
com/data-and-appendixes. We use the quarterly average of their monthly series with h = 3 (i.e., 3-month-ahead uncertainty).
4We are grateful to Carlo Pizzinelli for sharing with us the updated version of Shimer’s series as can be found at https:
//sites.google.com/site/robertshimer/research/flows.
5The shadow Federal funds rate is obtained from the author’s website, https://sites.google.com/view/jingcynthiawu/
shadow-rates.
6The retrieved series are the following (FRED series IDs are in parentheses): Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (CPIAUCSL), Civilian Unemployment Rate (UNRATE), Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods (PCND), Personal consumption expenditures: Nondurable goods (chain-type price
index) (DNDGRG3M086SBEA), Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services (PCESV), Personal consumption expenditures:
Services (chain-type price index) (DSERRG3M086SBEA), and Effective Federal Funds Rate (FEDFUNDS). Then, we obtain
the quantity indices by deflating the expenditures. Per capita variables are divided by Civilian Noninstitutional Population
(CNP16OV).
7Paul Volcker started his mandate on August 6, 1979.
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Figure 1: Empirical Responses to One-Standard Deviation Macro Uncertainty Shocks
Note: Grey areas indicate 68 percent confidence bands.
0.15 percent after seven quarters. The policy rate drops, but is only mildly significant. Importantly, inflation



















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Robustness Checks for Empirical Responses to One-Standard Deviation Macro Uncertainty Shocks
Note: Grey areas indicate 68 percent confidence bands.
studying uncertainty shocks find - see Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), Bonciani and van Roye (2016),
Leduc and Liu (2016), Basu and Bundick (2017), and Oh (2019).8
To make sure that our results are robust to different Cholesky ordering, sample periods, data series,
and VAR specifications, we conduct several robustness checks, which are shown by Figure 2. The first row
displays responses of a VAR where we put macro uncertainty as last in the recursive ordering of the variables.
The second row reports the impulse responses when we exclude the ZLB period. The third row replaces the
CPI inflation with the GDP deflator inflation. The last row shows responses of a VAR with one suggested by
the Bayesian information criterion, instead of two lags. In all cases, following a positive uncertainty shock we
get: a drop in the finding rate, an increase in the separation rate and the unemployment rate, and decrease
8The few exceptions are Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015), Katayama and Kim (2018), and Carriero et al. (2018b). The former
finds an inflationary effect of uncertainty shocks, while the last two find a non-significant response of inflation to uncertainty
shocks. However, they start their sample in 1975Q1, 1960Q3, and 1961M1 respectively, thus including the pre-Volcker period.
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in consumption and inflation.
Given this empirical evidence, Section 3 is going to build a model, which is able to replicate our empirical
findings. In particular, our goal is to obtain a drop in inflation and a significant amplification in the response
of macro and labor market variables following a positive uncertainty shock.
2.2 Micro Data
To gain a deeper understanding of the mechanism driving the macroeconomic dynamics, we carry out a
similar VAR exercise to Section 2.1, but we now use consumption micro data. This allows us to disentangle the
responses of households’ consumption across their income distribution. We use the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) data on consumption and income over the period 1982Q1-2015Q3. We follow Heathcote et
al. (2010), Anderson et al. (2016), and Ma (2018) in defining nondurable consumption. This comprises
food and beverages, tobacco, apparel and services, personal care, gasoline, public transportation, household
operation, medical care, entertainment, reading material, and education. As in Ma (2018), income is defined
as before-tax income, which is the sum of wages, salaries, business and farm income, financial income, and
transfers. To get income and non-durable consumption for households in real per capita values, we divide
them by family size (the number of family members), deflate by CPI-U series, and seasonally adjust by
X-12-ARIMA.9
Figure 3 exhibits the consumption responses to macro uncertainty shocks for the bottom 60% and the
top 40% of the households’ income distribution.10 The response of consumption is heterogeneous between
these two groups. In particular, what Figure 3 illustrates is that the drop in aggregate consumption is mainly
driven by the consumption response of the bottom 60%. Instead, the consumption response of households in
the top 40% is not significant. To show that the heterogeneity in the consumption responses is significant,
the third plot of Figure 3 displays the response of the ratio between the consumption of the bottom 60% and
the consumption of the top 40%. This response is negative and significant from the fourth quarter onward
and remains persistently negative until the twentieth quarter. This indicates that the consumption response
of households is heterogeneous: the most responsive to uncertainty are those who are at the bottom of the
income distribution.
We check the robustness of our results to the recursive ordering, the sample period, and the VAR
specification. Results are shown by Figure 4. The first row reports responses to an uncertainty shock when
9We are grateful to Eunseong Ma for sharing with us his CEX data on consumption.
10We chose the breakdown between the bottom 60% and the top 40% of the income distribution to match the calibration of
our model in Section 3, as in Challe et al. (2017) and Cho (2018). However, we have also run the VAR across the five quintiles
of the income distribution and we have found that the aggregate response is driven by the response of households in the three
lowest quintiles. The response of households in the fourth quintile is only mildly significant, while the response of households
in the fifth quintile is not significant.
9









































Figure 3: Empirical Responses of Consumption across Income Distribution to One-Standard Deviation Macro
Uncertainty Shocks
Note: “Bottom 60% Income” and “Top 40% Income” denote the consumption response of households respectively in the lowest
60% and the highest 40% of the income distribution. Grey areas indicate 68 percent confidence bands.
the macro uncertainty is ordered last in the Cholesky recursion. The second row exhibits responses of the
two income groups when we exclude the ZLB period. The last row displays responses when we run a VAR
with only one lag. All robustness checks indicate that the aggregate response of consumption is driven by
the response of households in the bottom 60%.
This micro data evidence suggests that households respond in a heterogeneous way across their income
distribution. Therefore, households’ heterogeneity is an important feature of the data that should not be
overlooked when studying the propagation of uncertainty shocks. Hence, in Section 3 we build a model with
heterogeneous agents to study the propagation of uncertainty shocks throughout the economy.
10










































































































































Figure 4: Robustness Checks for Empirical Responses of Consumption across Income Distribution to One-
Standard Deviation Macro Uncertainty Shocks
Note: “Bottom 60% Income” and “Top 40% Income” denote the consumption response of households respectively in the lowest
60% and the highest 40% of the income distribution. Grey areas indicate 68 percent confidence bands.
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3 The Model
To reproduce our empirical findings, we build a tractable heterogeneous agent New Keynesian model à la
Challe et al. (2017) and Challe (2019), where we introduce a technology process with stochastic volatility.
We then simulate a temporary increase in the stochastic volatility of technology and study how the economy
reacts. The reduced-form analysis conducted in Section 2 studies the impact of macro uncertainty. As
there is no direct theoretical equivalent to macro uncertainty, in the model we capture macro uncertainty by
focusing on a technology uncertainty shock.
The model features imperfect insurance against idiosyncratic unemployment risk in a New Keynesian
framework with labor market frictions à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). There are two types of house-
holds, a perfectly and an imperfectly insured one. Only perfectly insured households can own firms. Both
perfectly and imperfectly insured households participate in the labor and bond market and are subject
to idiosyncratic unemployment risk. However, while perfectly insured households fully share risk among
each other, imperfectly insured households cannot fully insure themselves against unemployment risk and
face a borrowing constraint. The two latter features generate precautionary saving motives for employed
imperfectly insured households.
To simplify the introduction of both labor market frictions and nominal rigidities, the production side is
made of four types of firms as in Gertler et al. (2008). First, labor market intermediaries hire labor from both
perfectly and imperfectly insured households, subject to search and matching frictions, and transform it into
labor services. Second, wholesale goods firms buy labor services in a competitive market to produce wholesale
goods used by intermediate goods firms. Third, intermediate goods firms buy wholesale goods, differentiate
it, and sell it monopolistically while facing price stickiness à la Calvo (1983). Fourth, a competitive final
good sector aggregates the intermediate good into a final good used for consumption and vacancy posting
costs. The nominal interest rate is set by a central bank which follows a standard Taylor rule.
To specify the timing of events within a period, every period can be divided into three sub-periods: a
labor market transition stage, a production stage and a consumption-saving stage. In the first stage, the
exogenous state is revealed, workers are separated from firms, firms open vacancies and new matches are
created. In the second stage, production takes place and the income components are paid out to the economy
agents as wages, unemployment benefits, and profits. In the third stage, asset holding choices are made and
the family heads redistribute assets across household members.
Challe et al. (2017)’s assumptions on imperfect risk sharing and a tight borrowing constraint faced
by imperfectly insured households allow us to reduce the state space to a finite dimensional object. If in
addition we assume that the borrowing constraint becomes binding after one period of unemployment spell,
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we can further reduce the heterogeneity of imperfectly insured households to three types. In Section 3.1 -
3.6, we are going to describe the model in detail by focusing on the specific case in which imperfectly insured
households are reduced to three types. For notation purposes, aggregate variables are in bold characters. In
addition, variables corresponding to the beginning of the labor transition stage are denoted with a tilde.
3.1 Households
There is a unit mass of households in the economy. Each household is endowed with one unit of labor. If at
the beginning of the production stage the household is employed, she supplies her unit of labor inelastically.
All households are subject to idiosyncratic changes to their employment status. A share f ∈ [0, 1] of the
unemployed households at the beginning of the labor market transition stage finds a job by the beginning
of the production stage, while a share s ∈ [0, 1] looses her job over the same period. There are two types of
households: a measure Ω ∈ [0, 1) of imperfectly insured ones and a measure 1−Ω of perfectly insured ones.
They all share the same period utility function u (c) = c
1−σ
1−σ , but they have a different subjective discount
factor. In particular, the discount factor βP of perfectly insured households is higher than the discount
factor βI of imperfectly insured ones.
3.1.1 Imperfectly Insured Households
Imperfectly insured households face idiosyncratic shocks to their employment state and are subject to a
borrowing limit that prevents them from borrowing beyond a given threshold a.
Employed households earn a wage w that gets taxed by a rate τ to pay for the unemployment benefit
bu that unemployed households receive. Since the unemployment insurance scheme is balanced every period,






where nI is the imperfectly insured households’ employment rate at the end of the labor market transi-
tion stage. Following the literature, we adopt the family structure according to which every imperfectly
insured household belongs to a representative family, whose head makes consumption and saving decisions
to maximize the family current and expected utility.
There are two crucial assumptions that Challe et al. (2017) make to keep the model tractable, while
still preserving the heterogeneity across imperfectly insured households: i) the borrowing limit is tighter
than the natural debt limit; ii) there is only partial risk sharing across members of the imperfectly insured
households. In particular, only employed members can fully insure each other by transferring assets. Instead,
no transfer is admitted between employed and unemployed members or across unemployed members.
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Because of idiosyncratic shocks and imperfect risk sharing, there is heterogeneity across imperfectly




of imperfectly insured households
over assets aI and unemployment spells N ≥ 0. Thanks to the two aforementioned assumptions, for every N
the cross-sectional distribution µ(aI , N) of imperfectly insured households can be summarized by the unique
mass point aI (N) and the associated number of imperfectly insured households nI (N).
Given X the vector of aggregate states,11 the head of a representative family of imperfectly insured






















aI ′ (N) ≥ a, (3)
aI ′ (0) + cI (0) = (1− τ)w + (1 + r)A, N = 0, (4)
aI ′ (N) + cI (N) = bu + (1 + r) a, N ≥ 1. (5)
Equation (3) is the borrowing constraint, where a is higher than the natural borrowing limit. Equation (4) is
the budget constraint of an employed household (the unemployment spell N is zero). An employed household
consumes cI (0) and buys assets aI (0), while receiving after tax income (1− τ)w and return from previously
held assets (1 + r)A. Equation (5) is the budget constraint of a household, who has been unemployed for
N periods. This household consumes cI (N), buys assets aI (N), gets the unemployment benefit bu and the
return (1 + r) a from previously held assets (of course, if these are negative assets, i.e. debt, r is the interest
paid on debt).




(1− s′) aI ′ (0) + f ′∑
N≥1
aI ′ (N)nI (N)
 , (6)





Equation (6) says that the next period value of assets that each employed imperfectly insured household
gets is the total of assets that next period employed imperfectly insured households bring divided by the
11See Section 3.6 for the aggregate state definition.
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total number of employed imperfectly insured households nI ′ (0), who belong to the family. The total of
assets that next period employed imperfectly insured households bring is given by the fraction of assets
that households who remain employed bring to the family (1− s′) aI ′ (0), plus the fraction of assets that
households, who become employed bring to the family f ′
∑
N≥1 a
I ′ (N)nI (N). Equation (7) says that next
period employed imperfectly insured households are given by the fraction of this period employed imper-
fectly insured households who remain employed (1− s′)nI (0), plus the fraction of this period unemployed





If N ≥ 1, the value of next period assets and next period unemployed households’ law of motion are
given by:
aI (N) = aI ′ (N − 1) , (8)
nI ′ (1) = s′nI (0) and nI ′ (N) = (1− f ′)nI (N − 1) if N ≥ 2. (9)
Equation (8) says that the value of next period assets of an imperfectly insured household, who has been
unemployed for N − 1 periods is equal to the value of this period assets of an imperfectly insured household,
who has been unemployed for N periods. Equation (9) says that next period unemployed people with one
period unemployment spell are the fraction of this period employed households, who become unemployed,
while next period unemployed with more than one period unemployment spell are the fraction of this period
unemployed households, who stay unemployed.
Imperfectly insured households face a binding borrowing limit after N̂ consecutive periods of unem-
ployment. This problem has a particularly easy solution for the case of N̂ = 1, which, following Challe et al.
(2017), is supported by empirical evidence (liquid wealth is fully liquidated after one period). When N̂ = 1,
in every period there are three types of imperfectly insured households: N = 0, N = 1, and N ≥ 2. To
these three types, there are the three following associated consumption levels cI (0), cI (1), and cI (2) for all
N ≥ 2, and the two following assets levels aI (0), and a. aI (0) is the asset level of employed households,
while a is the asset level of unemployed households. Since all unemployed households face a binding bor-
rowing constraint, their asset level is the same regardless of their unemployment spell. These three types
of imperfectly insured households are in number ΩnI, ΩsñI, and Ω
(
1− nI − sñI
)
. In equilibrium, for any
N ≥ 0 the Euler condition for imperfectly insured households is:
Eµ,X
[
M I ′ (N) (1 + r′)
]
= 1− Γ(N)
uc (cI (N))n (N)
, (10)
where M I(N) is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) and Γ(N) is the Lagrange multiplier
associated to the borrowing limit. When the household is employed (N = 0), the borrowing limit is not
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binding. Therefore, Γ (N) = 0 and the Euler condition holds with equality:
Eµ,X
[
M I ′ (0) (1 + r′)
]
= 1. (11)
Instead, when the household is unemployed (N ≥ 1), the borrowing limit is binding, Γ (N) > 0, and
Eµ,X
[
M I ′ (N) (1 + r′)
]
< 1. The IMRS is the ratio of the next-period and the current period marginal
utility:
M I ′ (0) = βI
(1− s′)uIc ′ (0) + s′uIc ′ (1)
uIc (0)
, N = 0, (12)
M I ′ (N) = βI
(1− f ′)uIc ′ (N + 1) + f ′uIc ′ (0)
uIc (N)
, N ≥ 1. (13)
Equation (12) is the IMRS of an employed household. The denominator is the current period marginal
utility. The numerator is the next period marginal utility, which is a weighted average of the household’s
marginal utility if she remains employed uIc
′ (0) times the probability of remaining employed 1 − s′, and
her marginal utility if she becomes unemployed uIc
′ (1) times the probability of becoming unemployed s′.
Similarly, Equation (13) is the IMRS of an unemployed household. In this case, the numerator is the weighted
average of the household’s marginal utility if she remains unemployed uIc
′ (N + 1) times the probability of
remaining unemployed while already being unemployed 1 − f ′, and her marginal utility if she becomes
employed uIc
′ (0) times the probability of becoming employed f ′.
3.1.2 Perfectly Insured Households
The fraction of employed members within every family of perfectly insured households before and after the
labor-market transitions stage are denoted by ñP and nP , respectively. We thus have:





nP = ñP ′. (15)
As before, these are family-level variables. The corresponding aggregate variables are denoted by ñP and nP.
Employed perfectly insured households earn after tax wage (1 − τ)wP , while unemployed perfectly insured
households get unemployment benefit buP . Also the unemployment insurance scheme of perfectly insured







Besides having a higher discount factor, what differentiates perfectly insured households from imper-
fectly insured ones is that there is full risk sharing among their family members, regardless of their employ-
ment status. This implies that all family members are symmetric, consume cP and save aP ′. The family
head of perfectly insured households solves:
V P
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cP + aP ′ = wPnP + (1 + r) aP + Π, (18)
where wP is the real wage that perfectly insured households get and Π is the profit from intermediate goods
firms and labor intermediaries, which are owned by perfectly insured households.
Since all perfectly insured households are homogeneous, they have the same Euler equation:
EX
[
MP ′ (1 + r′)
]
= 1, (19)
where the IMRS MP ′ is given by:






There are four types of firms in the economy. Labor intermediaries hire labor in a frictional labor market and
sell labor services to wholesale goods firms. Wholesale goods firms buy labor to produce wholesale goods in
a competitive market. Intermediate goods firms buy wholesale goods and sell them to the final goods firms
while facing Calvo (1983) price rigidities. Final goods firms aggregate intermediate goods into a final good.
3.2.1 Final Goods Firms
A continuum of perfectly competitive final goods firms combine intermediate goods, which are uniformly












where ε is the elasticity of substitution between two intermediate goods. Let pi denote the real price of







subject to Equation (21). The solution of the maximization gives the final firm’s demand of intermediate
good:
yi (pi) = p
−ε
i y, (23)







3.2.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate goods firm i produces xi with a linear technology yi = xi − Φ, where Φ is a fixed cost of
production. Firm i’s profit is then given by Ξ = (pi−pm)yi−pmΦ, where pm is the real price of intermediate
goods in terms of final goods. Intermediate goods firms choose pi to maximize the present discounted value
of future profits subject to the demand curve (23). They face pricing frictions à la Calvo (1983). Therefore,
every period only a share 1 − θ ∈ [0, 1] of firms is allowed to reoptimize over the price. The value of an
intermediate goods firm V R(X) that is allowed to reoptimize is:










MP ′V R (X ′)
]}
. (25)
The value of an intermediate goods firm V N (pi,−1, X) that is not allowed to reoptimize is:
V N (pi,−1, X) = Ξ + θEX
[





MP ′V R (X ′)
]
. (26)











































This pricing generates price dispersion. The price dispersion index ∆ =
∫ 1
0
p−εi di evolves according to the
following law of motion:






3.2.3 Wholesale Goods Firms
The wholesale good ym is produced by a continuum of perfectly competitive identical firms, which use a




The real unit price Q of labor services n is given by the first order condition:
Q = pmz. (34)
3.2.4 Labor Intermediaries
Labor intermediaries hire labor from both perfectly and imperfectly insured households in a frictional labor
market and sell labor services to wholesale goods firms. Every period there is exogenous separation rate
ρ between employers and workers. At the same time, labor intermediaries post vacancies at the unit cost
κ. There is a skill premium for perfectly insured households over imperfectly insured ones.12 In particular,
while an employed imperfectly insured household provides one unit of labor services and earns a wage w, an
employed perfectly insured household provides ψ > 1 units of labor services and earns wP = ψw. Hence,
12We follow Challe et al. (2017) in introducing a skill premium for the perfectly insured. As a matter of fact, consumption
heterogeneity in the U.S. cannot be fully imputed to the heterogeneity in asset income. Some heterogeneity in labor income is
needed to match the heterogeneity in consumption. We test the sensitivity of our results to the skill premium in Section 4.3.
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the values for a labor intermediary of a match with imperfectly and perfectly insured households are:
JI = Q− w + EX
[
(1− ρ′)M I ′JI ′
]
, (35)
JP = ψQ− ψw + EX
[
(1− ρ′)MP ′JP ′
]
, (36)
which implies that JI = ψJP . Moreover, given the vacancy filling rate λ, the free entry condition of labor
intermediaries implies that the value of opening a vacancy has to equalize its cost:
λ
(
ΩJI + (1− Ω) JP
)
= κ. (37)
The aggregate employment rate at the beginning and at the end of the labor market transition stage are
given respectively by
ñ = ΩñI + (1− Ω)ψñP, (38)
n = ΩnI + (1− Ω)ψnP, (39)
which implies that ñ′ = n.
The aggregate unemployment rate u is given by the unemployed households 1− ñ at the beginning of
the labor market transition stage plus the fraction ρ of employed households, who loose their job over the
period:
u = 1− ñ + ρñ. (40)
Firm-worker matches are created through the following matching technology
m = µuχv1−χ, (41)
where v are the posted vacancies, µ is the matching efficiency parameter, and χ is the elasticity of matches









Since the workers who loose their job at the beginning of the labor market transition period can be rematched
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within the same period, the period-to-period separation rate is:
s = ρ (1− f) . (44)
Given the job finding rate f and the job separation rate s, the law of motion of aggregate labor is:
n = f ñ + (1− s) ñ. (45)
As for wages, we assume that there are some rigidities à la Hall (2005). In particular, wages are set according









where γw indicates the indexation to previous period wage, φw indicates the elasticity of wages to deviations
of employment from its steady-state value n̄, and w̄ is the steady state wage.
3.3 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority follows a standard Taylor rule, where the nominal interest rate R reacts to inflation













where R̄ is the steady-state nominal interest rate, and φπ and φy are the reaction coefficients to inflation
and output growth.
The real interest rate is determined as follows:





The technology z used by wholesale goods firms is subject to first and second moment shocks according to
the following stochastic processes:
log z = ρz log z−1 + σ
zεz, (49)






In particular, εz ∼ N(0, 1) is a first-moment shock capturing innovations to the level of technology, while
εσ
z ∼ N(0, 1) is a second moment shock capturing innovations to the standard deviation σz of technology.
ρz and ρσz indicate the persistence of the two processes and σ
σz is the standard deviation of σz. The second
moment shock is how we introduce uncertainty into the model. We interpret a positive second moment shock
as an increase in uncertainty in the economy.
3.5 Market Clearing
3.5.1 Labor Market
All households face the same job finding rate f and job separation rate s. Since we assume that employment
is symmetric between perfectly and imperfectly insured households at the beginning of period zero, for
the law of large numbers it remains symmetric at every point in time. Hence, the share of perfectly and
imperfectly insured agents which is employed is the same, and family-level variables are equal to aggregate
variables:
ñP = ñI = ñP = ñI = ñ, (51)
nP = nI = nP = nI = n. (52)
Moreover, the aggregate labor supply is:
ΩnI + (1− Ω)ψnP = (Ω + (1− Ω)ψ) n, (53)
and the labor market clearing condition is:
(Ω + (1− Ω)ψ) n = ň. (54)
3.5.2 Assets Market
All households participate in the assets market, which is in zero net supply:
Ω (A+ (1− n) a) + (1− Ω) aP = 0. (55)
There are Ω imperfectly insured households and 1 − Ω perfectly insured households. Imperfectly insured
households own either A if their budget constraint is not binding or a if it is binding.13 Perfectly insured
13Since we have assumed that the borrowing constraint of unemployed imperfectly insured households becomes binding after
one period of unemployment spell, the assets that they own is equal to the borrowing limit a regardless of the length of
their unemployment spell N . This would not be the case if the borrowing limit became biding after more than one period of
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households own assets aP .
3.5.3 Goods Market
The final good production y has to be equal to the final good aggregate consumption c plus the cost of
posting vacancies:
c+ κv = y. (56)
Aggregate consumption is the share Ω of imperfectly insured households’ consumption plus the share 1−Ω
of perfectly insured households’ consumption cP . The former is made of the consumption of imperfectly
insured households who are employed nI (0) cI (0), who have been unemployed for one period nI (1) cI (1),
and who have been unemployed for at least two periods nI (2) cI (2):
c ≡ Ω
(
nI (0) cI (0) + nI (1) cI (1) + nI (2) cI (2)
)
+ (1− Ω) cP . (57)
Intermediate goods market is in equilibrium when the intermediate goods demand ∆y is equal to its supply
yi − Φ:
∆y = ym − Φ. (58)
Finally, the market clearing condition for the wholesale goods is:
∫ 1
0
xidi = ym = zň. (59)
3.6 Aggregate State and Equilibrium
The aggregate state X is given by:
X = yi =
{




When N̂ = 1, i.e. when the borrowing constraint becomes binding after one period of unemployment spell,
the heterogeneity of the imperfectly insured households can be reduced to three types: the employed type
N = 0, the unemployed type for one period N = 1, and the unemployed type for more than one period
N ≥ 2. These types are in shares of respectively: Ωn, Ωsñ, and Ω (1− n− sñ). In this specific case, a
symmetric equilibrium is given by the following conditions:
1. the Euler condition (19) and the IMRS (20) for the perfectly insured households hold, and the Euler
unemployment spell.
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condition (11) and the IMRS (12) for the imperfectly insured households hold;
2. the budget constraint for the perfectly insured households (18) and the budget constraints for the three
types of imperfectly insured households (4) and (5) with assets determined by (6) and (7);
3. the price set by optimizing firms, the inflation rate and the price dispersion are determined by (28) to
(32), and the real unit price of labor services by (34);
4. the aggregate employment and unemployment rates are given by (38), (39), and (40), the job finding
rate, the job filling rate, the period-to-period separation rate, and the matching function technology
by (42), (43), (44) and (41), the aggregate labor law of motion by (45), the value of a match and the
value of opening a vacancy are given by (35) to (37);
5. wages are determined according to (46), social contributions to (1) and (16), and nominal and real
interest rates to (47) and (48);
6. the market clearing conditions (51) to (59) hold.
3.7 Precautionary Savings
The model features precautionary savings induced by positive uncertainty shocks through two different
channels, a direct and an indirect one. The direct channel is due to households’ risk aversion. Since
all households are risk-averse, they behave in a precautionary manner when uncertainty increases. The
indirect channel is due to uninsured unemployment risk. While both perfectly and imperfectly insured
households bear unemployment risk, perfectly insured households fully share this risk, while imperfectly
insured households face partial risk sharing. Partial insurance further strengthens the precautionary saving
behavior of imperfectly insured households. Subsection 3.7.1 and 3.7.2 closely explain the two motives driving
the precautionary saving behavior of perfectly and imperfectly insured households.
3.7.1 Direct Precautionary Savings: Household Risk Aversion
Increased uncertainty directly triggers a precautionary saving behavior of risk-averse households. Let’s







Without loss of generality, we can shed light on the precautionary saving behavior by using the steady-state
IMRS and our baseline parametrization of σ = 2. If we assume that under certainty, relative consumption
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is cc = 1,
M̄ c = βcc−σ = β. (62)
If we assume that, under uncertainty, relative consumption can take either the low value of ccl = 0.9, or the
high value of cch = 1.1, both with probability q =
1
2 , then the IMRS is
M̄u = q × βccl−σ + (1− q)× βcch−σ = 1.03× β, (63)
M̄ c < M̄u. (64)
Due to convexity, the IMRS under uncertainty is larger than that under certainty. A higher IMRS induces
households to substitute out of consumption towards savings.
3.7.2 Indirect Precautionary Savings: Uninsured Unemployment Risk
Increased uncertainty further strengthens the precautionary behavior of imperfectly insured households
through an indirect channel. In particular, higher uncertainty triggers a drop in aggregate demand. This, in
turn, generates a fall in production and a decrease in posted vacancies. Less vacancies lead to a drop in the
finding rate f , which increases the endogenous separation rate s = ρ(1−f). A lower finding rate and a higher
separation rate increase the imperfectly insured households’ propensity to save. This last implication can be
derived from the IMRS of imperfectly insured households. In particular, if imperfectly insured households
are employed (N = 0), their IMRS is as follows:
M I ′ (0) = βI
(1− s′)uIc ′ (0) + s′uIc ′ (1)
uIc (0)
, N = 0. (65)
Their marginal utility of consumption when becoming unemployed uIc
′ (1) is higher than their marginal
utility of consumption when remaining employed uIc
′ (0), as falling into unemployment generates a drop in
consumption and marginal utility is decreasing in consumption. Therefore, whenever the separation rate s′
rises, the IMRS increases, thus pushing imperfectly insured households to save more. A similar reasoning
applies to the IMRS of imperfectly insured households who are unemployed (N ≥ 1):
M I ′ (N) = βI
(1− f ′)uIc ′ (N + 1) + f ′uIc ′ (0)
uIc (N)
, N ≥ 1. (66)
Whenever the finding rate f ′ drops, the IMRS increases as the marginal utility of consumption when remain-
ing unemployed uIc
′ (N + 1) is higher than the marginal utility of consumption when becoming employed.
Notice that since throughout the paper we assume that the borrowing limit becomes binding after one
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period of unemployment spell, only the Euler condition for N = 0 will hold with equality, while the Euler
condition for N > 0 will be slack. This implies that the precautionary saving motive will only concern
employed imperfectly insured households, who are the only type of imperfectly insured households allowed
to save. To the contrary, unemployed imperfectly insured households will be at their borrowing limit, so
their asset position will simply be a.
4 Quantitative Results
4.1 Calibration and Solution Method
For our baseline calibration, we mainly follow Challe et al. (2017) and Cho (2018). Table 1 reports the
parameter values for a quarterly calibration to the US economy over the period 1982Q1-2015Q3. The share
of imperfectly insured households Ω is calibrated to 0.60. Risk aversion σ is set to the standard value of
2. The discount factor of perfectly insured households βP is set to match an annual interest rate of 3%,
while the discount factor of imperfectly insured households βI is set to target a 21% consumption drop
when falling into unemployment. The unemployment benefits are calibrated to target a replacement rate of
33%. As for parameters related to firms, we set the elasticity of substitution between goods to get a 20%
markup. The fixed cost of production Φ is set to have a zero steady-state profit, while the price stickiness θ is
calibrated to have a price resetting spell of four quarters. Moving to labor market parameters, the matching
efficiency µ is set to target a job filling rate of 71%, while the job separation rate ρ to target a job finding
rate of 73%. The matching function elasticity χ is set to the standard value of 0.5. The vacancy posting
cost κ is calibrated to being 1% of output. The skill premium ψ is set to match the consumption share of
the poorest 60% of the households to 42%. The wage stickiness γw and the wage elasticity with respect to
employment φw follow Challe et al. (2017). As far as monetary policy parameters are concerned, we set
the steady-state inflation π̄ to target a 2% annual inflation, the interest rate inertia ρR to zero, the interest
rate responsiveness to inflation φπ to 1.5 and the interest rate responsiveness to output growth φy to 0.2.
Moving to the shock processes, we set the persistence ρz and the steady-state volatility σ̄
z of the technology
shock to the standard values of 0.95 and 0.007. As for the uncertainty shock process, following Katayama
and Kim (2018) we set the persistence ρσz and the volatility σ
σz to 0.85 and 0.37. These values are in line
with Leduc and Liu (2016) as well.
To study the effects of uncertainty shocks, we solve the model using a third-order perturbation method,
as suggested by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2011). The third-order perturbation moves the ergodic means of
the endogenous variables of the model away from their deterministic steady-state values. Hence, we compute
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Table 1: Quarterly Calibration
Parameter Description Value Target/Source
Households
Ω Share of impat. households 0.60 Challe et al. (2017)
a Borrowing limit 0 Challe et al. (2017)
σ Risk aversion 2.00 Standard
βI Discount factor of impat. households 0.917 21% consumption loss
βP Discount factor of pat. households 0.993 3% annual real interest rate
bu Unemployment benefits 0.27 33% replacement rate
Firms
ε Elasticity of substitution btw goods 6.00 20% markup
Φ Production fixed cost 0.22 Zero steady-state profit
θ Price stickiness 0.75 4-quarter stickiness
Labor Market
µ Matching efficiency 0.72 71% job filling rate
χ Matching function elasticity 0.50 Standard
ρ Job separation rate 0.23 73% job finding & 6.1% job loss rates
κ Vacancy posting cost 0.037 1% of output
ψ Skill premium 2.04 Bottom 60% consumption share (42%)
γw Wage stickiness 0.75 Challe et al. (2017)
φw Wage elasticity wrt employment 1.50 Challe et al. (2017)
Monetary Authority
π̄ Steady-state inflation 1.005 2% annual inflation rate
ρR Interest rate inertia 0 Standard
φπ Taylor rule coefficient for inflation 1.50 Standard
φy Taylor rule coefficient for output 0.20 Standard
Exogenous Processes
ρz Persistence of technology shock 0.95 Standard
σ̄z Volatility of technology shock 0.007 Standard
ρσz Persistence of uncertainty shock 0.85 Katayama and Kim (2018)
σσ
z
Volatility of uncertainty shock 0.37 Katayama and Kim (2018)
the impulse responses in percent deviation from the stochastic steady state of each endogenous variable. For
that, we use the Dynare software package developed by Adjemian et al. (2011) and the pruning algorithm
designed by Andreasen et al. (2018).
4.2 Baseline Results
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses of the variables of interest to a one standard deviation shock in
technology uncertainty. The solid blue line shows the responses of the HANK model described in Section
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3, while the dashed red line shows the responses of the corresponding representative agent New Keynesian
(RANK) model. This model is identical to the HANK model except that there are no imperfectly insured
households, that is Ω = 0. In this case, there is only one type of households, the perfectly insured ones, who
fully share risk. As a benchmark, we first describe the responses of the RANK model, before illustrating the
responses generated by the HANK model.
4.2.1 Responses of the RANK Model
In the RANK model, a positive uncertainty shock in technology has both an aggregate demand effect
through households’ saving decisions and an aggregate supply effect through firms’ pricing decisions. On the
one hand, higher uncertainty induces a negative wealth effect on risk-averse households, who increase savings
and decrease consumption (see Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015, Leduc and Liu, 2016, Basu and Bundick,
2017, and Oh, 2019 for this precautionary saving channel). This causes a drop in aggregate demand. The
decrease in aggregate demand reduces the marginal cost that firms are facing and pushes them to lower
prices to stimulate demand. On the other hand, an increase in uncertainty triggers a precautionary pricing
behavior of firms, which are subject to Calvo pricing. When uncertainty increases, optimizing firms increase
their prices to self-insure against the risk of being stuck with low prices in the future (see Born and Pfeifer,
2014, Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015, and Oh, 2019 for this precautionary pricing channel). Since the
increase in prices induced by the precautionary pricing behavior of firms is stronger than the drop in prices
induced by the precautionary saving behavior of households, inflation increases after a positive uncertainty
shock.
4.2.2 Responses of the HANK Model
The HANK model adds a new channel of transmission and amplification of the uncertainty shock to the pre-
cautionary saving and pricing behavior described above for the RANK model. This is graphically illustrated
by Figure 6.
As explained for the RANK model, an uncertainty shock causes a drop in aggregate demand triggered
by the precautionary saving behavior of households. The drop in demand induces firms to lower their
vacancy posting, thus reducing the job finding rate and increasing the unemployment rate. At this point
the presence of imperfectly insured households becomes key to explain the dynamics of the model. Since
imperfectly insured households cannot fully insure against unemployment as they are subject to imperfect risk
sharing, a higher unemployment risk induces them to further increase savings and decrease consumption. The
imperfectly insured households’ precautionary saving behavior triggers a feedback loop, which reinforces the
drop in aggregate demand. At the same time, firms precautionary pricing behavior generates a reduction in
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to One-Standard Deviation Technology Uncertainty Shocks
Note: Impulse responses of output, consumption, vacancy, and real wage are in percent deviation from their stochastic steady
state, impulse responses of unemployment rate and job finding rate are in percentage point deviations from their stochastic










Figure 6: Propagation Mechanism of a Positive Uncertainty Shock
vacancy posting and an increase in unemployment. This further reinforces the precautionary saving behavior
of imperfectly insured households and strengthen the feedback loop. Figure 7 illustrates the responses of
consumption for both imperfectly (dashed line) and perfectly (dotted line) insuredhouseholds. Because of
the precautionary saving behavior that partial risk sharing induces on imperfectly insured households, their
consumption response is much stronger than the one of perfectly insured households.
The presence of heterogeneous agents bears two consequences on the propagation mechanism of un-
certainty shocks. First, the feedback loop triggered by the precautionary saving behavior of imperfectly
insured households is strong enough to induce a drop in prices that outweighs the increase in prices due to
the precautionary pricing behavior of optimizing firms. This is the reason why, after two quarters, inflation
response becomes negative, which is in line with our empirical results as shown by Figure 1. Second, the
feedback loop amplifies all the responses. The precautionary behavior of imperfectly insured households
triggers a drop in aggregate demand, which is much stronger than in the RANK model. In parallel, the
decrease in vacancy posting and the increase in unemployment rate are sharper.
It is worth noticing that our results hinge upon the interaction between the precautionary saving
behavior of agents induced by imperfect risk sharing and the precautionary pricing behavior of firms induced
by price rigidities à la Calvo (1983). It is the interaction between these two features that allows us to obtain
a drop in inflation and an amplification of responses, which quantitatively match the empirical evidence.
Absent these features, this would have been possible only by relying on unusual Taylor rules. An example of
these is the ‘Alternative Taylor rule’ of Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), where the central bank responds
to fiscal volatility shocks. This Taylor rule specification is hard to reconcile with central bank independence.
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Figure 7: Consumption Heterogeneity
Note: Impulse responses of consumption are in percent deviation from their stochastic steady state.
Besides, it is still unable to generate a nominal interest rate response to an increase in uncertainty that is
consistent with their empirical evidence.
Since the presence of imperfectly insured households is crucial both to determine the response of inflation
and to amplify the responses of the other variables, Figure 8 shows how the impulse responses vary when
varying the share of imperfectly insured households. On impact, inflation increases regardless of the share
of imperfectly insured households. As soon as the negative feedback loop on aggregate demand induced by
the precautionary saving behavior of imperfectly insured households kicks in, inflation decreases. Indeed,
the higher is the share of imperfectly insured households, the stronger the feedback effect becomes and the
more inflation drops. Figure 8 also shows that a bigger share of imperfectly insured households amplifies
the responses of the other variables. In particular, output, consumption, vacancies, job finding rate, and
wages drop more, while unemployment rate increases more, the higher is the share of imperfectly insured
households.
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Figure 8: Different Degrees of Heterogeneity
Note: Impulse responses of output, consumption, vacancy, and real wage are in percent deviation from their stochastic steady
state, impulse responses of unemployment rate and job finding rate are in percentage point deviations from their stochastic
steady state, while inflation and policy rate are in annualized percentage point deviations from their stochastic steady state.
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4.3 Sensitivity Analyses
This section illustrates sensitivity exercises on various parameters, which affect the strength of the precau-
tionary saving motive for imperfectly insured households.
The first row of Figure 9 shows how consumption and inflation respond when we vary households’
risk aversion σ. A higher risk aversion generates a stronger precautionary response of imperfectly insured
households, who cannot fully insure against risk. Hence, the more risk-averse imperfectly insured households
are, the bigger the shift of their response out of consumption and towards savings. At the same time,
inflation, which increases on impact, drops faster the higher the risk aversion is. This is due to the feedback
effect that the precautionary saving behavior of households has on aggregate demand.
The second row of Figure 9 shows sensitivity of consumption and inflation response to various con-
sumption differences between employed and unemployed households. Indeed, the bigger the consumption
differential is between the two employment states, the stronger the precautionary saving motive that leads
employed imperfectly insured households to save more, thus triggering a sharper drop in consumption and
inflation.
The third sensitivity exercise that we carry out is on imperfectly insured households’ consumption
share (C60/C). This share is important as it negatively affects the skill premium ψ of perfectly insured
households over imperfectly insured ones (as shown in Table 1, we calibrate the skill premium by targeting
the share of imperfectly insured households’ consumption). The bigger the imperfectly insured households’
consumption share, the more the precautionary saving behavior of imperfectly insured households affects
aggregate consumption, thus amplifying the drop in consumption and inflation caused by an uncertainty
shock.
The next sensitivity exercise is on the elasticity of substitution between two intermediate goods ε. As
shown in Oh (2019), a higher elasticity makes the marginal profit curve of intermediate firms more convex,
thus strengthening the precautionary pricing behavior of firms. This is why, on impact, a higher elasticity
causes a sharper increase in inflation. On the contrary, as soon as the higher prices set by intermediate firms
trigger an increase in unemployment, the amplification effect of imperfectly insured households’ precautionary
saving behavior on aggregate demand kicks in, thus counteracting the price increase and leading to a sharper
fall in inflation.
The first row of Figure 10 shows the sensitivity of consumption and inflation responses to different
levels of wage rigidity. Wage stickiness affects unemployment risk. Namely, more rigid wages increase
unemployment risk, thus strengthening the precautionary saving motive of imperfectly insured households
and leading to a sharper drop in consumption. At the same time, wage stickiness also affects the pricing
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Figure 9: Sensitivity Analyses 1
Note: Impulse responses of consumption are in percent deviation from their stochastic steady state, while impulse responses of
inflation are in annualized percentage point deviations from their stochastic steady state.
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Figure 10: Sensitivity Analyses 2
Note: Impulse responses of consumption are in percent deviation from their stochastic steady state, while impulse responses of
inflation are in annualized percentage point deviations from their stochastic steady state.
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behavior of firms, leading to a higher price on impact and then to a sharper drop in inflation.
The next sensitivity exercises concern the parameters of the Taylor rule. The second row shows con-
sumption and inflation responses when we vary the persistence ρR of the interest rate in the Taylor rule.
The more persistent the interest rate is, the milder the precautionary saving motive of households, which
makes consumption and inflation drop by less.
The third and fourth rows of Figure 10 show consumption and inflation responses to an uncertainty shock
for different levels of monetary policy responsiveness. In particular, the more responsive monetary policy is
to inflation (the higher φπ), the smoother the real interest rate. A smoother real interest rate path reduces
the inter-temporal substitution of imperfectly insured households, thus dampening the drop in consumption
induced by an uncertainty shock. Indeed, the more responsive monetary policy is to inflation, the less
inflation responds to an uncertainty shock. Monetary policy responsiveness to output growth deviations
from its steady state affects the impact response of consumption, but not of inflation. Consumption drops
less on impact in response to higher uncertainty if monetary policy is more responsive. A more responsive
monetary authority lowers the interest rate more, thus dampening the precautionary saving motive faced by
imperfectly insured households.
5 Disentangling the Precautionary Channels
To decompose how much of our results is driven by the direct and the indirect precautionary saving channel
as well as by the precautionary pricing channel, this section compares the RANK and the HANK models
studied in the previous sections to identical models where we substitute the Calvo (1983)-type price rigidity
with the Rotemberg (1982)-type price rigidity. As the Rotemberg pricing assumption does not feature any
precautionary pricing effect, comparing the responses of models with the two different pricing assumptions
allows us to quantify how much of the uncertainty shock propagation is due to the precautionary pricing
effect. Before exploring in detail how comparing HANK and RANK models with Calvo and Rotemberg
pricing is helpful in disentangling the three precautionary channels, let us discuss what changes need to be
made to the model when we substitute Rotemberg pricing to Calvo pricing.
As before, an intermediate good firm chooses price pi to maximize the present discounted value of future
profits subject to the demand curve (23). Now, its value is given by:
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y is a quadratic price adjustment cost. Imposing a symmetric equilibrium across
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firms implies that pi = 1 and yi = y. The optimal Calvo price equilibrium conditions (28), (29), and (30)
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Moreover, the intermediate goods market clearing condition (58) is replaced with
y = ym − Φ, (69)
as Rotemberg-type frictions do not generate price dispersion. On the other hand, they generate price










y = y. (70)
Except for the equations mentioned above, all the other equilibrium conditions stay the same.
Figure 11 plots impulse responses to a positive uncertainty shock for the HANK (Ω = 0.6) and the
RANK (Ω = 0) model with Calvo and Rotemberg pricing. By comparing the four models we can precisely
isolate the three precautionary channels: the direct precautionary saving channel, the indirect precautionary
saving channel, and the precautionary pricing channel.
Let’s first focus on the RANK models. The RANK model with Rotemberg pricing only features the
direct precautionary saving channel explained in Section 3.7.1. Through this channel, a positive uncertainty
shock generates a negative wealth effect on risk-averse households, who decrease their consumption and
increase their savings, thus lowering aggregate demand. While the only precautionary channel at play
in the RANK model with Rotemberg pricing is the direct precautionary saving one, the RANK model
with Calvo pricing adds the precautionary pricing channel. Hence, the difference between the responses of
the RANK model with Calvo pricing and the RANK model with Rotemberg pricing helps us gauging the
strength of the precautionary pricing channel. As explained in Section 4.2.1, with Calvo-type frictions firms
engage in a precautionary pricing behavior. This behavior leads them to increase prices to such an extent
to overcompensate the downward pressure that the aggregate demand drop exerts on prices. That is the
reason why the inflation response is positive on impact in the Calvo RANK model. On the contrary, the
precautionary pricing motive is absent in the Rotemberg pricing model, where all firms are symmetric and
are allowed to reset their price every period, even though subject to an adjustment cost - see Oh (2019) for
a thorough comparison between the Calvo and Rotemberg pricing models in response to uncertainty shocks.
The absence of the precautionary pricing motive results in a drop in the inflation response to an increase in
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Figure 11: Comparison to Rotemberg Pricing
Note: Impulse responses of output, consumption, vacancy, and real wage are in percent deviation from their stochastic steady
state, impulse responses of unemployment rate and job finding rate are in percentage point deviations from their stochastic
steady state, while inflation and policy rate are in annualized percentage point deviations from their stochastic steady state.
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uncertainty. In addition to the opposite response of inflation, a further difference between the two RANK
models is that the Calvo pricing model generates more amplified responses. This difference is again induced
by the precautionary pricing behavior of firms. Higher prices reduce consumption and push firms to cut their
vacancy posting, thus decreasing the job finding rate and increasing the unemployment rate more than in
the Rotemberg model. To generate even more amplification and a response of inflation fully in line with the
data, a HANK model with Calvo pricing is necessary. This model features all three precautionary channels:
the direct precautionary saving, the indirect precautionary saving and the precautionary pricing channel.
Comparing the responses of the HANK model with Calvo pricing to the RANK model with Calvo pricing
allows us to isolate the effect of the indirect precautionary saving channel, which is the only precautionary
channel that differentiates the two models. The heterogeneity of households in the HANK model enriches the
dynamics of the RANK model with the precautionary saving behavior of imperfectly insured households, who
reduce their consumption more when unemployment risk rises. This depresses aggregate demand more than
in the RANK model. This indirect precautionary saving channel is necessary to contemporaneously obtain
a drop in inflation as well as an amplification in the responses of the other variables that is quantitatively
in line with the empirical evidence.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown how households’ heterogeneity helps explaining the propagation of uncertainty shocks
to the macroeconomy. First, it has estimated a VAR of macro variables and the macro uncertainty index
of Jurado et al. (2015) to provide empirical evidence that an increase in uncertainty generates a drop in
output, consumption, inflation and the job finding rate rate, while it triggers a rise in the unemployment
and the separation rate. Second, it has estimated a VAR by using CEX Surveys data instead of aggregate
consumption data to show that households respond heterogeneously across the income distribution and that
the households belonging to the bottom 60% of the income distribution are more responsive than those
belonging to the top 40%. Third, it has built a HANK model with SaM frictions and Calvo-type price
rigidities to rationalize our empirical findings. In response to a positive uncertainty shock, the interaction
between the precautionary saving behavior of partially insured households, the labor market SaM frictions,
and the precautionary pricing behavior of firms is able to generate: i) a drop in inflation, and ii) responses
of output, consumption, and the policy rate, which are quantitatively as well as qualitatively in line with
the empirical evidence.
Our model abstracts from capital and investment. Introducing capital would provide households with
an illiquid asset through which to precautionarily save when uncertainty increases. The option to accumulate
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capital would dampen the decrease in aggregate demand following a rise in uncertainty. This would somewhat
weaken the feedback loop triggered by the precautionary saving behavior of uninsured households, which
would nevertheless still be present. To get a response in aggregate demand similar to the model without
capital, we would need to allow households to save also through a liquid bond. We leave the addition of
capital and a liquid bond as well as a more thorough analysis of their implications to future studies.
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Andreasen, Martin M., Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, and Juan Rubio-Ramı́rez, “The Pruned
State-Space System for Non-Linear DSGE Models: Theory and Empirical Applications,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 2018, 85 (1), 1–49.
Angelini, Giovanni, Emanuele Bacchiocchi, Giovanni Caggiano, and Luca Fanelli, “Uncertainty
across Volatility Regimes,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2019, 34 (3), 437–455.
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